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In FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), the Supreme 
Court held that in cases challenging alleged “reverse payment” 
settlements of patent litigation arising in the context of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, the Rule of Reason applies—no per se 
rules, no quick look, no shortcuts. Actavis arose in the context 
of a motion to dismiss and explicitly left to the lower courts the 
task of structuring the Rule of Reason analysis. Following 
Actavis, how the lower courts should apply the Rule of Reason 
has been the subject of considerable debate. The FTC and 
private plaintiffs,  as well as law professors aligned with their 
views, have attempted to find in Actavis justifications for 
injecting shortcuts and presumptions that would undermine 
the Court’s clear holdings. Those efforts have thus far been 
largely rejected in post-Actavis litigation. As we argue, courts 
should continue to reject such efforts—which rest on 
presumptions rather than proof—and preserve the integrity of 
the Rule of Reason. 
 
I. Introduction ................................................................. 46 
II. The Twin Holdings of Actavis: All the Rest is 
Commentary ................................................................ 48 
 
* Saul P. Morgenstern is a partner in the firm of Arnold & Porter Kaye 
Scholer LLP (“Arnold & Porter”), resident in its New York office. Adam M. 
Pergament is an associate of the firm resident in its Washington, D.C. office. 
This Commentary represents the views of its authors, and should not be 
read as representing the views of any other person or entity, including 
Arnold & Porter or any of its clients. This Commentary is provided for news 
and information purposes, to encourage discussion of the law and its 
potential applications, and does not take into account the specific facts or 
circumstances that may apply to individual situations. It does not 
constitute, nor should it be considered, legal advice, generally or as to a 
specific matter, or a warranty of any kind. Readers are responsible for 
obtaining legal advice from their own legal counsel. 
LECTURE_COMMENTARY_FINAL  
46 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
 
A. Background on Hatch-Waxman Act Features that 
Incentivize Patent Litigation Settlements 
Involving “Reverse Payments” .............................. 48 
B. The Holdings ......................................................... 51 
C. The Commentary ................................................... 51 
III. Actavis Requires Inquiry Under the Rule of  
Reason—Without Shortcuts ........................................ 54 
IV. Presumptions and Shortcuts that the FTC, Plaintiffs, 
and Professors Seek Are Contrary to Actavis’ Holdings 
and Could Damage Rule of Reason Analysis  
Generally ...................................................................... 56 
V. Applying the Rule of Reason to “Reverse Payment” 
Settlement Agreements ............................................... 61 
A. But-For World of “Alternative Settlement” .......... 61 
B. But-For World of “No Settlement” ........................ 64 
VI. Conclusion .................................................................... 69 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1898, as a judge on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
William Howard Taft wrote the landmark antitrust decision 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.1 There, he 
recognized a distinction between naked and ancillary 
restraints that would help set the stage for the modern day 
Rule of Reason. Taft would go on to become President and 
Chief Justice of the United States. More than a century later, 
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis2 held that the Rule of 
Reason applies in cases challenging alleged “reverse payment” 
settlements of litigation arising in the context of the Hatch-
Waxman Act. How the lower courts should apply the Rule of 
Reason following Actavis is the subject of considerable debate; 
what is clear is that the Actavis Court might have done well 
to draw lessons from Taft’s jurisprudence, and from his sage 
 
1 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), 
aff’d 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
2 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
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advice: “Don’t write so that you can be understood; write so 
that you can’t be misunderstood.”3 
In the lead-up to Actavis, the Federal Trade Commission 
(the “FTC”) and private plaintiffs seeking to challenge so-
called “reverse payment” settlements sought a rule of 
presumptive, if not per se, illegality for such agreements. At 
the same time, parties to such settlements advocated for a rule 
that rendered them virtually per se lawful as long as the 
settlement was within the term and substance of the patent—
dubbed the “scope of the patent test”—which was adopted by 
a majority of courts led by the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit. On the strength of a circuit split created by 
an outlier Third Circuit decision applying a so-called “quick 
look” Rule of Reason analysis,4 the Supreme Court took up the 
question in Actavis and rejected both positions. It held that so-
called reverse payment settlement agreements challenged in 
subsequent antitrust litigation must be analyzed under the 
full Rule of Reason—no per se rules, no quick look, no 
shortcuts.5  
Following Actavis, the FTC and private plaintiffs, as well 
as law professors aligned with their views, have attempted to 
find in Actavis justifications for injecting shortcuts and 
presumptions that would undermine those clear holdings. 
Those efforts have thus far been largely rejected in post-
Actavis litigation, most notably in In re Wellbutrin XL 
Antitrust Litigation,6 which was decided by the Third 
Circuit—the same court that had before Actavis adopted a 
“quick look” approach. We explain below why courts should 
 
3 Gerald Lebovits, Free at Last from Obscurity: Achieving Clarity, 16 
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 127, 127 (2015) (quoting President and later 
Chief Justice Taft). 
4 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2013), vacated 
sub nom. Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013). 
5 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (“The FTC urges us to hold that reverse 
payment settlement agreements are presumptively unlawful and that 
courts reviewing such agreements should proceed via a ‘quick look’ 
approach, rather than applying a ‘rule of reason’ . . . . We decline to do so.”) 
(citation omitted). 
6 In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 132, 167 (3rd Cir. 2017). 
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continue to reject such efforts—which rest on presumptions 
rather than proof—and preserve the integrity of the Rule of 
Reason. 
II. THE TWIN HOLDINGS OF ACTAVIS: ALL THE 
REST IS COMMENTARY 
A. Background on Hatch-Waxman Act Features that 
Incentivize Patent Litigation Settlements Involving 
“Reverse Payments” 
Patent settlement agreements involving so-called “reverse 
payments” arise most frequently under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.7 The Act allows generic drug manufacturers to obtain 
expedited Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval to 
market a previously-approved drug by filing an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (“ANDA”). When filing an ANDA, a 
generic manufacturer must certify that the generic drug has 
the same active ingredients as, and is biologically equivalent 
to, a previously-approved brand-name drug.8 To obtain FDA 
approval, the generic manufacturer must also certify in one of 
several ways that the generic drug does not infringe valid and 
outstanding patents. One such way is through a “Paragraph 
IV” certification, which states that that the patent is either 
“invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or 
sale” of the generic drug.9 The first generic manufacturer to 
file a Paragraph IV certification is eligible for 180 days of 
market exclusivity, during which time the FDA cannot 
approve another generic manufacturer’s ANDA.10 Following a 
Paragraph IV certification, a brand-name manufacturer has 
forty-five days to file an infringement action, which stays FDA 
 
7 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.). 
8 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv) (2017). 
9 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
10 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
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approval of the ANDA for thirty months to allow the 
infringement action (the Paragraph IV litigation) to proceed.11 
Typically, because a generic manufacturer that files a 
Paragraph IV certification has yet to enter the market, it 
cannot be liable for patent infringement damages.12 Thus, 
unlike traditional patent litigation between patent owners 
and infringers—in which the infringer runs the risk of 
removal from the market and incurring damages liability for 
past infringement—the only economic risks that the first 
filing generic manufacturer runs in litigating are the cost of 
litigation and the opportunity cost of the 180 days of exclusive 
generic sales it cannot make if it loses. In contrast, the brand 
manufacturer faces the risk that its patent is held invalid or 
non-infringed, which costs it the market exclusivity that 
comes with owning a valid patent. As a result, while all 
settlements involve consideration of some sort flowing in both 
directions, Paragraph IV litigation settlements for a number 
of years often included a substantial cash payment by plaintiff 
(brand-name manufacturer) to the alleged infringer (generic 
manufacturer) as part of the settlement.13 Because in 
 
11 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  
12 See Gerald Sobel, Consideration of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases 
Challenging Hatch-Waxman Act Settlements, 20 FED CIR. B.J. 47, 51 (2010) 
(“Unlike the usual patent case, there are ordinarily no damages claims 
against the generic because Hatch-Waxman forces the litigation to occur in 
the period prior to marketing by the generic. As a result, no sales or profits 
are lost by the patentee to the generic. While patent infringement suits are 
often settled by compromise of a damages claim, that vehicle is typically not 
available in Hatch-Waxman cases.”). 
13 Of course, as many have observed, “any settlement agreement can 
be characterized as involving ‘compensation’ to the defendant, who would 
not settle unless he had something to show for the settlement.” Asahi Glass 
Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (2003). For example, 
“traditional” patent infringement cases involving a wide variety of products 
have been settled on terms that include forgiveness of some or all of the 
liability for past infringement damages alongside provisions for withdrawal 
of the infringing product from the market and acknowledgments of validity, 
enforceability and infringement, and a transfer of “value” from the patent 
owner to the infringer to facilitate reaching a settlement agreement that 
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traditional patent litigation cash ordinarily flows from the 
alleged infringer to the patent owner, the consideration that 
flows from the plaintiff to the defendant in such Paragraph IV 
litigation settlements came to be called a “reverse payment.”14 
In Actavis, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split 
regarding the level of antitrust scrutiny that lower courts 
should apply to settlements involving alleged reverse 
payments. The Eleventh Circuit (and others) had applied the 
“scope of the patent test,” holding that reverse payment 
settlements are lawful so long as they do not restrain trade 
beyond the legitimate scope of the patent’s exclusionary 
potential.15 The Third Circuit, meanwhile, applied the “quick 
look” test. Under that test, a reverse payment settlement is 
prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, 
and the defendant has the burden of showing procompetitive 
justifications for the settlement agreement.16 
 
both terminates the challenge to the patent and, often, results in the generic 
exiting the market or agreeing to pay future royalties to the patentee. 
14 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
15 FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 
2012). The Eleventh Circuit’s view arguably recognizes—in patent 
language—the fact that the settlement agreement removes (for the generic 
manufacturer and the market as a whole) an existing barrier to entry that 
one cannot be certain would have been lifted in the absence of the 
settlement. Lifting that veil of uncertainty and assuring that the generic 
can enter the market (barring other obstacles) is inherently procompetitive. 
There is no principle in antitrust law that requires parties entering into a 
procompetitive agreement to negotiate the “most procompetitive” 
agreement possible. See, e.g., King Drug Co. of Florence v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 408–09 (3d Cir. 2015). As such, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s refusal to examine whether, in the absence of a payment the 
parties might have agreed to a different entry date, or to allow the Federal 
Trade Commission (the “FTC”) or plaintiffs to speculate as to what an 
optimal entry date would have been, made antitrust sense. 
16 In Re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), 
vacated sub nom. Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013). The Third Circuit’s approach arguably ignores the benefits of the 
settlement agreement as a whole, and simply assumes either that (i) in the 
absence of the payment, the parties would have agreed to an earlier entry 
date and antitrust law requires them to do so, or (ii) in the absence of the 
settlement the generic manufacturer would have prevailed. As noted above, 
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B. The Holdings 
The Actavis case must be considered in light of its 
procedural posture. There, the Eleventh Circuit had affirmed 
dismissal of a complaint brought by the FTC. The only task 
before the Supreme Court was to decide whether the FTC’s 
complaint stated a plausible claim.17 
The Court reversed, holding that the Eleventh Circuit 
should have permitted the FTC’s lawsuit to proceed.18 The 
Court held that reverse payment settlements—even where 
they permit entry within the scope of the relevant patent—
can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.19 But the Court 
rejected the FTC’s position that reverse payment settlement 
agreements are presumptively unlawful and subject to review 
under the “quick look” test.20 Instead, under Actavis, courts 
must scrutinize reverse payment settlement agreements 
under the “Rule of Reason.”21 The Actavis holdings end there. 
The rest is commentary. 
C. The Commentary 
Writing for the Actavis majority, Justice Breyer did not 
purport to adopt a new Rule of Reason analysis. Indeed, he 
explicitly left to the lower courts the task of structuring the 
Rule of Reason analysis.22 And, in rejecting the quick-look 
test, he wrote that “the FTC must prove its case as in other 
rule-of-reason cases.”23  
 
the first assumption is legally untenable. See supra note 15. As shown 
below, the second assumption is inherently speculative, and equally 
untenable. See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
17 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. at 2237. 
21 See id. 
22 Id. at 2238. 
23 Id. at 2237. 
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However, Justice Breyer offered “five sets of 
considerations” justifying the Court’s holding.24 The 
“considerations” are, however, laden with conditional 
language. For instance, he observed that “sometimes” patent 
settlements will have “genuine adverse effects on 
competition,”25 and that “these anticompetitive consequences 
will at least sometimes prove unjustified.”26 Most notably, he 
predicted that “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent 
validity to answer the antitrust question” because “[a]n 
unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally 
suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the 
patent’s survival,” and using a “payment . . . to prevent the 
risk of competition . . . constitutes the relevant 
anticompetitive harm.”27 Justice Breyer’s reliance on words 
like “sometimes” and “normally suggests” do not, in our view, 
 
24 See id. at 2234. 
25 See id. at 2234–35. 
26 See id. at 2235–36. 
27 See id. at 2236–37. Justice Breyer also observed that “where a 
reverse payment threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the 
patentee likely possesses the power to bring that harm about in practice,” 
and that parties may still “settle in other ways” such as “by allowing the 
generic manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s 
expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to 
that point.” Id. at 2236–37.  Of course, even an entry-date settlement that 
complies fully with Actavis prevents the risk of competition until the agreed-
upon entry date.  Thus, the prevention of risk alone cannot be the basis for 
a judgment that a settlement violates the antitrust laws. For this reason, 
Professor Michael A. Carrier overextends Actavis in suggesting that our 
approach “fails to sufficiently appreciate Actavis’s focus on the ‘prevent[ion 
of] the risk of competition’ as ‘the relevant anticompetitive harm.’ Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. at 2236.” See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason in the Post-
Actavis World, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 25, 38 n.69 (2018). One might be 
able to justify using “prevention of the risk of competition” as 
anticompetitive harm justifying allowing a case to proceed past a motion to 
dismiss, which is all that Justice Breyer did in Actavis. But Actavis 
mandates that alleged reverse-payment settlements be evaluated under the 
Rule of Reason. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. In any event, Actavis does 
not provide a basis for relieving an antitrust plaintiff of the obligation to 
prove injury in fact—an element of antitrust liability—to obtain relief under 
the antitrust laws.  
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provide a basis on which one can impose presumptions and 
shortcuts on the Rule of Reason analysis required—
particularly in light of the holding rejecting the FTC’s effort 
to do just that. More importantly, the majority’s casual 
substitution of presumed patentee “doubts” for actual judicial 
findings is, as discussed below, particularly troubling and 
without legal foundation.28  
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, dissented. Addressing the tension between patent 
and antitrust policies at the core of the majority’s opinion, he 
wrote: “The problem, as the Court correctly recognizes, is that 
we’re not quite certain if the patent is actually valid, or if the 
competitor is infringing it. But that is always the case, and is 
plainly a question of patent law.”29 Accordingly, Chief Justice 
Roberts disagreed with Justice Breyer’s suggestion that it will 
not normally be necessary to litigate patent validity to answer 
the antitrust question: 
[S]ettling a patent claim cannot possibly impose 
unlawful anticompetitive harm if the patent holder is 
acting within the scope of a valid patent and therefore 
permitted to do precisely what the antitrust suit 
claims is unlawful. This means that in any such 
antitrust suit, the defendant (patent holder) will want 
to use the validity of his patent as a defense—in other 
words, he’ll want to say “I can do this because I have 
a valid patent that lets me do this.”30 
As Chief Justice Roberts recognized, there is tension between 
the Actavis Court’s holding mandating that plaintiffs must 
prove their claims “as in other rule-of-reason cases,”31 and 
Justice Breyer’s justifications for the Court’s holdings. 
 
28 See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
29 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2240 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
30 Id. at 2244. 
31 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
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III. ACTAVIS REQUIRES INQUIRY UNDER THE 
RULE OF REASON—WITHOUT SHORTCUTS 
From the dawn of the Rule of Reason in Addyston Pipe32 
through modern times, Rule of Reason analysis has grown to 
embrace a core principle: Judging whether an agreement 
violates the law requires an analysis of anticompetitive 
effects.33 Of course, asking whether an agreement has 
anticompetitive effects leads to an inevitable question: 
Compared to what? Answering that question requires 
benchmarking the resulting market against a market posited, 
counterfactually, in the absence of the allegedly 
anticompetitive agreement.34 That counterfactual market has 
come to be called the “but-for” world—i.e., what would have 
happened but for the allegedly anticompetitive agreement.35 
Describing such a but-for world and determining whether the 
 
32 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), 
aff’d 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
33 See William H. Rooney & Timothy G. Fleming, Introduction: William 
Howard Taft, the Origin of the Rule of Reason, and the Actavis Challenge, 
2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 14 (2018); see also Carrier, supra note 27, at 29. 
34 See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
(1918) (explaining that under the Rule of Reason, the court must consider 
“the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its 
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the 
restraint and its effect, actual or probable”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (the Rule of Reason focuses on 
“challenged restraint’s impact on competitive conditions”).  
35 That analysis is excused only in per se cases—not because those 
cases involve a different competitive harm—but because long experience 
teaches that there is little too potential market benefit to the agreement at 
issue, and significant if not certain risk of harm, such as agreements among 
competitors to fix or raise prices, rig bids, or allocate markets. See, e.g., Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 
85, 103, 104 (1984); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 
19–20 (1979); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 
(1978). In recent decades, the universe of agreements deemed per se 
unlawful has shrunk, as courts have recognized that agreements previously 
thought to be always or almost always anticompetitive effect have been 
shown to yield benefits for competition. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
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post-agreement market is less competitive than the but-for 
market is an essential step in determining whether the 
challenged agreement has caused injury to competition. And, 
of course, injury to competition is a required element of the 
antitrust violation—no injury to competition, no antitrust 
violation.36  
The Actavis holdings, which rule out per se rules and 
presumptions, pose a challenge for courts attempting to 
implement the Rule of Reason in a case involving alleged 
reverse payments. The starting point for analysis must be a 
settlement that resolves bona fide patent litigation that either 
party could conceivably win, as opposed to sham litigation.37 
The settlement typically includes an entry date beyond which 
a generic challenger might have entered if it won the patent 
litigation and earlier than it would have entered if it had lost 
the patent litigation.  
The settlement of bona fide patent litigation is both lawful 
and procompetitive. Among other benefits, settlements 
provide certainty as to when the patent barrier to entry will 
be lifted and an entry date earlier than the patent expiration 
date. That certainty is important to the generic, it is 
important for the brand, and it is important to the patients 
and payers. It saves the parties money, business time, and the 
distraction of litigation. It also relieves the courts and 
taxpayers of the costs imposed by litigation. 
Courts must be disciplined in avoiding unwarranted 
shortcuts. The marketing phrase “pay-for-delay” carries a 
presumption that where a patent settlement includes a 
reverse payment, entry is necessarily delayed beyond what 
would have transpired in some alternative scenario. But 
whether a payment that accompanies a patent litigation 
settlement is a “restraint” at all is a question of fact that must 
 
36 See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: 
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 337a (4th 
ed. 2017) (“To say that the plaintiff has not shown any injury to competition 
is to conclude that the antitrust laws have not been violated at all.”). 
37 Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 
49, 60 (1993). 
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be proven. To establish that a payment is a restraint requires 
the plaintiff to show that, without the payment, the market 
would have been more competitive—i.e., that generic entry 
would have taken place sooner. 
IV. PRESUMPTIONS AND SHORTCUTS THAT THE 
FTC, PLAINTIFFS, AND PROFESSORS SEEK ARE 
CONTRARY TO ACTAVIS’ HOLDINGS AND COULD 
DAMAGE RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS 
GENERALLY 
Following Actavis, however, commentators and plaintiffs 
have seized on Justice Breyer’s commentary in construing the 
Actavis holding to permit shortcuts that replace the 
traditional analysis of anticompetitive effects under the Rule 
of Reason in cases involving alleged reverse payments. The 
approach that Professor Michael Carrier has proposed is one 
example.38 
The burden-shifting framework for applying the Rule of 
Reason that Professor Carrier outlines accurately describes a 
way to order the process of a Rule of Reason litigation.39 
Under this framework, the Rule of Reason analysis has four 
potential steps. First, the plaintiff has the burden of showing 
a substantial anticompetitive effect.40 Second, if the plaintiff 
meets its burden, the defendant has the burden of showing a 
procompetitive justification.41 Third, the plaintiff can, but 
need not, show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary 
to achieve the defendant’s objective, or that there are less 
restrictive alternatives.42 According to Professor Carrier, if 
the plaintiff cannot show a less restrictive alternative, the 
plaintiff does not lose the case; it simply means that the 
plaintiff does not prevail at step three.43 Fourth, the court 
 
38 Carrier, supra note 27, at 40–43.  
39 Id. at 29–31. 
40 Id. at 29. 
41 Id. at 29–30. 
42 Id. at 30. 
43 Id. 
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must balance the anticompetitive and procompetitive 
effects.44 So far so good. 
While the process Professor Carrier describes is an 
uncontroversial description of the litigation process, process 
does not dictate substance. As noted above, the framework 
requires a plaintiff to establish, as a predicate for moving 
forward, a substantial anticompetitive effect.45 Professor 
Carrier proposes to allow plaintiffs to satisfy that obligation 
in reverse payment cases by relying on layers of presumptions 
that would undermine the Rule of Reason inquiry. In 
particular, Professor Carrier maintains that the Actavis court 
“adopted shortcuts favoring plaintiffs.”46 He reads into the 
Rule of Reason analysis Justice Breyer’s observation that the 
size of the unexplained payment may serve as a “workable 
surrogate” for the strength of the patent.47 He thus proposes 
that a plaintiff may meet its burden of showing substantial 
anticompetitive effects by showing a “limit on generic entry 
and compensation to the generic.” Put another way—the 
plaintiff merely has to show that a large unexplained payment 
was made, and the required “anticompetitive effect” of 
anything other than immediate entry is presumed. According 
to Professor Carrier, this presents plaintiffs with “powerful 
tools” for overcoming the first step of the burden-shifting 
inquiry.48 Of course, relieving the plaintiff of its obligation to 
 
44 Id. Professor Carrier is correct that the application of the Rule of 
Reason framework is the same whether the plaintiff is the FTC or a private 
party seeking damages. See id. at 44. Both have to establish anticompetitive 
effects to get past step one of the analysis. As Professor Carrier notes, a 
private party seeking damages must also prove antitrust injury—i.e., that 
it suffered injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent—
as a result of the reduction in competition, and to what degree. See id. at 42 
n.94.  
45 Id. at 29. 
46 Id. at 37. 
47 Id. at 36. 
48 While Professor Carrier acknowledges that the burden-shifting 
framework makes sense as a means for minimizing the number of cases in 
which courts must balance anticompetitive and procompetitive effects, he 
proposes an application of the framework that would effectively eliminate 
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prove anticompetitive effects as it would be required to in any 
other Rule of Reason analysis gives it a “powerful tool,” as it 
assumes away the core obligation one acquires upon filing an 
antitrust complaint. Doing so based on the proffered 
assumptions would be misguided for at least two reasons. 
First, it requires reading Actavis—a decision on a motion 
to dismiss—as intending to sub silentio upend a century of 
Rule of Reason jurisprudence by injecting shortcuts and 
presumptions, despite the Court’s affirmative holding 
explicitly rejecting the FTC’s request that it do so. Second, the 
articulated presumption—that the payment itself can satisfy 
the step one requirement that the plaintiff show 
anticompetitive effects in order to shift the burden to the 
defendant—rests on other, unsustainable presumptions. Once 
these are examined, the house of cards falls. 
Professor Carrier does not explicitly define what 
constitutes a “large” payment.49 Nor did the Actavis Court. 
Justice Breyer suggested that a reverse payment reflects 
“traditional settlement considerations” where it does not 
exceed “avoided litigation costs.”50 But this observation is 
insufficient to support the proposition that a payment in 
excess of avoided litigation costs satisfies the plaintiff’s 
burden to prove anticompetitive effects. The existence of a 
payment in excess of litigation costs alone does not establish 
that generic entry would have taken place earlier in the but-
 
its first step. Indeed, as described above, a “limit on generic entry and 
compensation to the generic” are features of nearly every settlement of 
litigation that arises under Paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id. at 
41. Professor Carrier also states that the Actavis Court “was not willing to 
accept” procompetitive justifications beyond avoided litigation costs and or 
costs of generic services. Id. at 38. Note, however, that the Court expressly 
stated that “there may be other justifications,” and, more fundamentally, 
that the Actavis Court did not purport to apply a Rule of Reason analysis; it 
held only that the FTC had stated a plausible claim such that dismissal was 
unwarranted. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
49 We agree with Professor Carrier that most courts have held that a 
payment is not limited to cash.  
50 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013). 
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for world.51 Allowing it to do so would conflict with the express 
holding in Actavis that reverse payment settlement 
agreements are not subject to review under the “quick look” 
test, which shifts to defendants in the first instance the 
burden of proving procompetitive effects.52 
The eagerness to rely on the payment alone rests on the 
faulty assumption that it is a reasonable proxy for patent 
“weakness,” which itself relies on two underlying 
presumptions: First, that the patentee would not pay the 
money unless it expected to lose the patent case, and second, 
that the federal judge presiding over the settled Paragraph IV 
litigation would have seen it the same way. Because each of 
these assumptions is flawed, the presumptions that Professor 
Carrier layers on them are equally flawed. 
As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Wellbutrin 
XL recognized, risk aversion makes it difficult to use the size 
of a reverse payment as a surrogate for patent strength.53 This 
is because parties may be willing to accept a settlement payoff 
that is smaller than the expected payoff in litigation in 
exchange for certainty. In Wellbutrin XL, the court cited a 
useful example: Consider a lottery ticket that has a fifty 
percent chance of a $0 payoff and a fifty percent chance of a 
$100 million payoff.54 The expected payoff is $50 million, but 
most people would be willing to accept substantially less (e.g., 
$20 million) for certainty of a payoff.55 Accepting $20 
million—and thus “paying” $30 million for certainty—does 
not reflect a belief that a $0 payoff is more than a fifty percent 
 
51 As an economic matter, there is considerable debate over whether 
and to what degree a rule prohibiting reverse payments in excess of avoided 
litigation costs would restrict procompetitive settlements. See, e.g., Aaeron 
Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16 (2013); Barry C. Harris et 
al., Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story, 28 ANTITRUST 83 (2014); 
Aaron Edlin et al., Actavis and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, 14 ANTITRUST 
SOURCE 1 (2014). 
52 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
53 See In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 132, 168–69 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
54 See id. at 168.  
55 See id. 
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risk.56 The lottery example—which presumes perfect 
information—thus shows that the size of the “payment” does 
not serve as a surrogate for the but-for world, even if the 
parties accurately perceive patent strength. 
Professor Carrier describes the “lottery” example as 
“resuscitat[ing] the risk-aversion defense rejected in 
Actavis.”57 But whether risk aversion is a justification or a 
defense addresses a point different from the point made in 
Wellbutrin and here. Risk aversion explains why the size of a 
payment does not necessarily reflect a patentee’s view of the 
strength of the patent.58 Accordingly, risk aversion is relevant 
because it negates a presumption that Professor Carrier and 
others propose be utilized to satisfy plaintiff’s burden of 
proving that generic entry would have taken place earlier but-
for the parties’ settlement. Nor, for that matter, does a 
patentee’s confidence, of lack of it, in its patent—even if it 
could be inferred from the payment—support any inference as 
to what a federal judge might have ruled in the settled 
Paragraph IV litigation, for reasons explained below.59 
Treating a “large” payment as a surrogate for 
anticompetitive effects thus requires layers of unsupportable 
presumptions that are intended to support two alternative 
ultimate presumptions at the core of the very first step of Rule 
of Reason inquiry—the requirement that a plaintiff establish 
an anticompetitive effect. It presumes that, without the 
payment, a settlement would still have occurred, and that it 
would have included a term for earlier generic entry. 
Alternatively, it presumes that the generic challenger would 
have prevailed in the patent litigation. Neither ultimate 
presumption is grounded in antitrust law. 
 
56 See id. 
57 See Carrier, supra note 27, at 40, 
58 See Wellbutrin XL, 868 F.3d at 168–69 (rejecting the argument that 
size of payment is a “surrogate” for the patent’s weakness).  
59 See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
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V. APPLYING THE RULE OF REASON TO 
“REVERSE PAYMENT” SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENTS 
In cases following Actavis, plaintiffs seeking to establish 
anticompetitive effects have offered two principal but-for 
theories. The first theory is that, absent the reverse payment 
settlement, the parties would have entered into an 
“alternative settlement” providing for earlier generic entry. 
The second theory is that, absent the reverse payment 
settlement, there would have been no settlement, and the 
generic firm would have prevailed in the underlying patent 
litigation. Both theories present challenges. 
A. But-For World of “Alternative Settlement” 
The “alternative settlement” theory poses both doctrinal 
and evidentiary challenges, and may not provide a 
satisfactory basis for evaluating anticompetitive effects in a 
but-for world. As the Third Circuit explained in King Drug Co. 
of Florence v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., “Actavis does not 
stand for the proposition that parties must reach the most 
procompetitive settlements possible.”60 Thus, a comparison 
between an actual, real-world settlement and a hypothetical, 
“alternative settlement” in the but-for world does not contain 
a relevant baseline: 
[B]ecause the relevant baseline is the result that 
would have occurred in the absence of any agreement, 
it is not a cognizable harm simply to show that the 
parties might have elected a different settlement 
agreement more favorable to competition and 
consumers.61 
In the view of courts that follow this line of thought, the 
relevant baseline is the “level of competition that would have 
 
60 King Drug Co. of Florence v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 
388, 408–09 (3d Cir. 2015); see also In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 
150 n.10 (2015). 
61 In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 864 n.10 (2015). 
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obtained absent settlement, i.e., if the parties had litigated 
validity/invalidity and infringement/noninfringement to a 
judicial determination.”62 This approach recognizes that the 
payment at issue is part of a larger procompetitive settlement, 
and properly declines to impose an obligation on the parties to 
reach the most procompetitive agreement possible. 
This brings us back to William Howard Taft and Addyston 
Pipe. If there is a doctrinal basis that might justify the 
“alternative settlement” theory—or anything remotely like 
it—it may be the ancillary restraint doctrine first articulated 
by then-Circuit Judge Taft: 
[N]o conventional restraint of trade can be enforced 
unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary 
to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and 
necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment 
of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect 
him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits 
by the other party.63 
Of course, before one can determine whether a restraint is 
“ancillary,” one must identify the restraint. Presumably, 
plaintiffs in so-called “reverse payment” cases would argue 
that the restraint is defined by the period before entry, which 
they assume (but at some point would have to prove) would 
have been shorter but for the payment. Or, they could argue 
that the mere presence of the payment itself is the restraint. 
Either way, whether a term is ancillary, and thus permissible, 
depends on whether the challenged term was necessary to 
achieve the lawful objectives of the agreement.64 In the 
context of a patent settlement agreement involving alleged 
reverse payments, the plaintiff’s burden would be to show that 
the alleged payment (and entry date agreement) was not 
 
62 Id. at 864. 
63 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 272 (6th Cir. 
1898), aff’d 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
64 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 21–
22 (1979); Polk Bros. Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189–90 
(7th Cir. 1985); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 
F.2d 1381, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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necessary to achieve the settlement, the presumptively lawful 
purpose of which was to eliminate the uncertainty as to 
whether and when the existing patent barrier to entry would 
be lifted, as well as the continuing burden and cost of litigation 
on the parties, the court, and the taxpayers.65 If the plaintiff 
cannot meet this burden, the court should grant summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants. 
Whether a payment was necessary to achieve the lawful 
objectives of a patent settlement agreement is a question of 
fact. The Third Circuit in Wellbutrin XL explained that, to 
withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that, 
more likely than not, the parties would have reached an 
alternative settlement in the but-for world.66 In practice, even 
where the evidence of settlement discussions is voluminous, 
there may not be evidence that would permit a plaintiff to 
meet its burden. The plaintiff cannot meet its burden merely 
by showing that the parties may have been able to reach an 
alternative settlement.67 Such a showing would simply be too 
speculative. And, of course, a plaintiff cannot meet its burden 
by showing that, absent the payment, the parties would have 
entered into “alternative settlement,” but without an earlier 
 
65  The Court in one post-Actavis decision framed the “alternative 
settlement” scenario in similar terms, noting that there may be injury to 
competition “if there is evidence in the but-for world that the parties would 
have reached an agreement to drop the patent litigation in exchange for 
early generic entry into the market” without a reverse payment. United 
Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA 
(“Lidoderm”), No. 14-MD-02521-WHO, 2017 WL 5068533, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 3, 2017). Arnold & Porter is counsel for one of the defendants in 
Lidoderm. While this article notes the Lidoderm court’s holding on 
summary judgment, as noted above, this article represents the views of its 
authors, and should not be read as representing the views of any other 
person or entity, including Arnold & Porter or any of its clients. 
66 See In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 132, 167 (3rd Cir. 
2017); see also Lidoderm, 2017 WL 5068533, at *11 (endorsing “alternative 
settlement” theory to the extent that it “shows but-for the reverse-payment 
agreement, the parties would have reached a settlement that was still anti-
competitive and caused unjustified harm to consumers”) (emphasis added). 
67 See Wellbutrin XL, 868 F.3d at 167. 
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entry date. Under that scenario, there would have been no 
anticompetitive effect. 
To date, in the limited set of cases following Actavis, there 
is no reported example of a case in which a plaintiff has 
successfully proven that the defendants would have reached 
an alternative settlement in the but-for world.68 
B. But-For World of “No Settlement” 
In the “no settlement” scenario, the underlying litigation 
continues. In this scenario, a plaintiff can show that earlier 
entry would have taken place in the but-for world only by 
showing that the alleged generic infringer would have won  
the underlying patent litigation (by invalidating the patent or 
showing non-infringement). As noted, the but-for 
counterfactual essential to the “no settlement” scenario is 
patent litigation in which either party “could realistically 
expect success on the merits.”69 
The Supreme Court appears to have been unanimous in 
the view that litigating the settled patent case is not the 
correct path,70 and for good reason. It is important to note that 
the question in the subsequent antitrust case is not—and 
should not be—whether the patent is valid or infringed. 
Rather, it is whether the federal judge presiding over the 
settled patent case would have, in the absence of the 
 
68 In In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, the First 
Circuit held explained that the trial court verdict “reflected the jury’s 
finding that [brand manufacturer] AstraZeneca would not have agreed to 
settlement terms with a license date earlier than May 27, 2014, the date on 
which two of its medical patents expired.” 842 F.3d 34, 64 (1st Cir. 2016).  
In Lidoderm, the court held that plaintiffs’ “alternative settlement” theory 
was legally cognizable and that there was sufficient evidence to deny 
summary judgment. Lidoderm, 2017 WL 5068533, at *10, *13. The 
Lidoderm case settled in February 2018, shortly before trial. 
69 Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 
49, 60 (1993). 
70 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37; id. at 2244 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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settlement, ultimately found that the patent was invalid or 
not infringed.71 
Attempting to use a “large” payment as a surrogate for who 
would have prevailed in the underlying litigation is especially 
problematic. The payment does not show who would have won 
the litigation; at most it can be read to suggest that the 
patentee had less confidence in what the judge might do than 
the absence of a payment would suggest, if one ignores 
entirely the risk aversion issue described in Wellbutrin XL 
and above.72 But what the patentee fears is not the issue; the 
issue is what the judge in the underlying patent litigation 
would have found. We are aware of no legal foundation for 
substituting a party’s risk-assessment for a judicial outcome. 
Moreover, no later antitrust jury should be permitted to try 
to intuit what that federal judge would have done for two 
reasons. First, the exercise is inherently speculative, and it 
inappropriately relies on predictions about potential judicial 
outcomes.73 Second, the antitrust jury will have information 
that would have been unavailable to the judge in the 
underlying patent litigation, for good reason—that the patent 
litigation settled, and on what terms. Because such 
 
71 Hatch-Waxman cases involve no claims for damages because the “act 
of infringement” is a statutory fiction—the filing or the Paragraph IV 
certification. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)); 
Senju Pharm. Co. v. Apotex Inc., 746 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014). They 
are therefore ordinarily tried to judges. See, e.g., Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. 
Roxane Labs., Inc., No. 08-CV-3853 DMC, 2009 WL 1140440, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 28, 2009); Biovail Labs., Inc. v. Torpharm, Inc., No. 01 C 9008, 2002 
WL 1732372, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2002). As a result, any approach that 
involves an antitrust jury later making its own determinations of validity 
and infringement, rather than confining itself to deciding what the patent 
litigation judge would have done, risks migrating infringement and validity 
determinations originally committed to a judge to a later antitrust jury. 
Patent owners settling Paragraph IV cases would thus have to consider 
whether they want their patents tested by a judge or a jury in deciding 
whether to settle the Paragraph IV case, putting a new risk factor into the 
settlement calculus with unknown consequences.  
72 See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
73 See Joshua B. Fishman, The Circular Logic of Actavis, 66 AM. U. L. 
REV. 91, 96 (2016). 
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information is recognized as prejudicial, had the settlement 
negotiations failed and the litigation proceeded, such evidence 
would ordinarily be precluded from trial in the patent 
litigation under Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Consequently, 
there is no way to reconstruct the but-for world as it would 
have existed—i.e., the mind of a federal judge deciding 
validity and infringement based on the evidentiary record 
available at the time the Paragraph IV litigation would have 
been tried.  
The proffered alternatives to litigating what would have 
happened in the underlying patent case are thus entirely 
unsatisfying. As a result, if the evidence at trial shows that, 
absent the challenged payment, the settlement would not 
have happened, the court should grant summary judgment for 
the defendant(s). 
Fortunately, courts have to date largely rejected efforts by 
plaintiffs to use payment as a proxy for a patent’s weakness 
or as a prediction of what would have happened in any earlier 
Paragraph IV litigation. But how they have done so has been 
imperfect at best. Some have required that plaintiffs 
introduce some evidence on the merits of the underlying 
patent litigation. For example, in Wellbutrin XL,74 the district 
court explained that the “existence of a valid and uninfringed 
patent would interfere with the plaintiffs’ chain of causation: 
a valid patent independently precludes competition apart 
from any agreement and an ‘at-risk’ launch is unlawful absent 
a later finding of patent invalidity or non-infringement.” 
Without evidence to show that patents would have been 
declared invalid or that an at-risk launch would not have 
infringed the patents, the “patent served as an independent 
regulatory bar to a generic’s launch.”75  
The Third Circuit affirmed, making clear that “in order to 
evaluate the merit of the litigation-based scenario, we must 
 
74 In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 133 F. Supp. 3d 734, 764 (E.D. 
Pa. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75 Id. at 767. 
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consider the substance of that underlying litigation.”76 In a 
footnote, the court addressed Justice Breyer’s commentary 
that it normally will not be necessary to litigate patent 
validity to answer the antitrust question,” which Chief Justice 
Roberts had criticized as implausible. The court observed that 
the present case appeared to vindicate the Chief Justice’s 
analysis, and that “we cannot resolve this aspect of the case 
without considering the merits of the underlying patent 
case.”77  
In In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit likewise rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument that they should not have to prove 
invalidity or non-infringement to pursue an at-risk launch 
theory.78 There, the court explained that plaintiffs failed to 
provide sufficient evidence that “the brand-name’s patents 
would have been declared invalid or that an ‘at risk’ launch 
would not have infringed the patents,” and “without such 
evidence, the patent served as an independent regulatory bar 
to a generic’s launch.”79 Thus the plaintiffs could not establish 
that the challenged settlement, rather than the legitimate 
operation of the patents, caused their alleged injuries.80 
More recently, in Lidoderm, the court held that a plaintiff 
must provide “some evidence” that the generic could have won 
the patent litigation.81 The court observed that “some 
 
76 In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 132, 167 (3d Cir. 2017); 
see also Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 604, 614 (E.D. Pa. 
2017) (explaining that the “clear import of Nexium and Wellbutrin [XL]is 
that a plaintiff must offer some evidence of non-infringement or patent 
invalidity in order to proceed on an at-risk launch theory of causation”). 
77 In re Wellbutrin XL, 868 F.3d at 167 n.58. 
78 In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Litig., 842 F.3d 34, 62–64 (1st Cir. 
2016). 
79 See id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 See id. 
81 Lidoderm, No. 14-MD-02521-WHO 2017 WL 5068533, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 3, 2017); see also In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) 
Antitrust Litig., No. CV 14-MD-02503, 2018 WL 563144, at *14 (D. Mass. 
Jan. 25, 2018) (same). Like other courts, the courts in Lidoderm and 
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evidence” is “not the same as requiring plaintiffs to prove that 
the generic defendant would have won, only that it could 
have.”82 That observation may have addressed the court’s 
valid concern about litigating the patent case,83 but it also 
reveals the flaw in adopting a “some evidence” standard. As 
noted above, in a “no settlement” scenario, “some evidence” 
that a generic defendant could have won the patent litigation 
is the starting point for analysis—absent proof that the 
litigation was a sham, either party “could realistically expect 
success on the merits” of the underlying patent case.84 Thus, 
requiring “some evidence” that the generic could have won the 
patent litigation—i.e., the mere possibility of generic entry—
to stand in for proving the existence of a but-for world by a 
preponderance of the evidence is tantamount to requiring no 
evidence at all.  
These courts were correct in concluding that a reverse 
payment alone cannot be a proxy for the likely outcome of the 
underlying patent case. However, their willingness to 
consider evidence as to validity or infringement invites 
similar shortcuts and risks imposing later judgments as to the 
patent’s strength on the relevant question—namely, what 
would the judge have done in the underlying Paragraph IV 
litigation—thus reflecting a lack of focus on the inherent 
speculative-ness of attempting to construct a but-for world 
around an underlying settled litigation. For the reasons 
provided above, courts should not permit parties, or juries, to 
speculate as to what a federal judge in a prior litigation would 
have decided. 
 
Solodyn did not ground their analyses in application of the Rule of Reason, 
focusing instead on “causation.” Id. 
82  Id. at *4 (emphasis in original).  
83  See id. at *5. 
84  Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 
49, 60 (1993). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
If the case law since Actavis has made anything clear, it is 
that the decision generated more questions than it answered. 
The Actavis holdings on the motion to dismiss at issue are 
clear—no per se rules, no quick looks, no presumptions. The 
majority’s commentary, while meant to respond to risks 
identified by the dissent, makes for interesting intra-judicial 
debate but does not support the subsequent efforts to 
undermine the Court’s clear holdings. To date, the lower 
courts have largely rejected those efforts. But it is likely only 
a matter of time before more courts succumb to the temptation 
to use the shortcuts that Actavis rejected. Accordingly, it is 
unlikely that Actavis will be the final opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to address challenges to patent settlement 
agreements in the Hatch-Waxman context. 
